The Progressive Era of Constitutional Amendment by Albert, Richard
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
1-1-2015
The Progressive Era of Constitutional Amendment
Richard Albert
Boston College Law School, richard.albert@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Legal History
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard Albert. "The Progressive Era of Constitutional Amendment." Eficiência e Ética na Administração Pública, edited by Luiz Alberto
Blanchet et al., Editora Íthala, Curitiba (2015): 197-219.
EFICIÊNCIA E ÉTICA NA 
ADMINISTRAÇÃO PÚBLICA
EF
IC
IÊ
N
CI
A 
E 
ÉT
IC
A 
N
A 
AD
M
IN
IS
TR
AÇ
ÃO
 P
ÚB
LI
CA
prefácio de Emerson Gabardo 
COORDENADORES 
Luiz Alberto Blanchet
Daniel Wunder Hachem
Ana Claudia Santano
CO
O
RD
EN
AD
O
RE
S 
Lu
iz
 A
lb
er
to
 B
la
nc
he
t
D
an
ie
l W
un
de
r 
H
ac
he
m
A
na
 C
la
ud
ia
 S
an
ta
no
COORDENADORES
Luiz Alberto Blanchet
Professor Titular de Direito Administrativo 
da PUCPR. Doutor e Mestre em Direito do 
Estado pela UFPR. Membro do Instituto 
dos Advogados do Paraná, do Instituto 
Paranaense de Direito Administrativo, do 
Instituto Brasileiro de Direito Administra-
tivo e da Academia Brasileira de Direito 
Constitucional. Advogado.
Daniel Wunder Hachem
Professor do Programa de Mestrado e 
Doutorado em Direito da PUCPR, do De-
partamento de Direito Público da UFPR 
e do Instituto de Direito Romeu Felipe 
Bacellar. Doutor e Mestre em Direito do 
Estado pela UFPR. Membro da Rede Do-
cente Eurolatinoamericana de Direito Ad-
ministrativo e do Foro Iberoamericano de 
Direito Administrativo. Advogado.
Ana Claudia Santano
Pós-doutoranda em Direito Público Eco-
nômico pela PUCPR. Doutora e mestre 
em Ciências Jurídicas e Políticas pela 
Universidad de Salamanca. Membro da 
Asociación Iberoamericana de Derecho 
Electoral, do Instituto Paranaense de Di-
reito Eleitoral e da Comissão de Respon-
sabilidade Social e Política da OAB/PR.
As questões relativas à eficiência e à ética na Administração Pública, en-
volvendo temas como combate à corrupção, gestão dos serviços públicos, 
relações público-privadas, falta de transparência e acesso à informação 
tornaram-se centrais no cenário jurídico brasileiro e estrangeiro, deman-
dando a busca por instrumentos e soluções voltados ao aprimoramento 
do bom governo e da boa administração dos assuntos públicos. Essa é a 
temática desta obra – EFICIÊNCIA E ÉTICA NA ADMINISTRAÇÃO 
PÚBLICA – composta por artigos apresentados por pesquisadores nacio-
nais e estrangeiros (Argentina, Brasil, Colômbia, Estados Unidos e Peru), 
de onze instituições de ensino superior, no Seminário Internacional de 
mesmo título promovido pelos Programas de Pós-Graduação (stricto sen-
su) em Direito da PUCPR, UFPR e UniBrasil em agosto de 2015, com 
o financiamento do Programa de Apoio a Eventos no País (PAEP) da 
CAPES. Os trabalhos foram agrupados em cinco partes: Parte I – Gestão 
eficiente e ética na efetivação de serviços públicos relativos a direitos 
sociais; Parte II – Impactos da ineficiência e da corrupção no processo de 
desenvolvimento nacional; Parte III – Instrumentos de combate à corrup-
ção na Administração Pública; Parte IV – Mecanismos de aprimoramento 
da gestão pública transparente, eficiente e democrática; Parte V – Resu-
mos apresentados na sessão de comunicados científicos.
ithala.com.br
COLABORADORES
•	Adriana da Costa Ricardo Schier
•	Alan Luiz Bonat
•	Állison Ricardo do Prado
•	Ana Claudia Santano
•	Ana Cristina Aguilar Viana
•	Andrés Fernando Ospina Garzón
•	Ane Elise Brandalise Gonçalves
•	Ariel Maldaner
•	Carolina Alves das Chagas
•	Daniel Castanha de Freitas
•	Daniel Fernando Pastre
•	Daniel Ferreira
•	Daniel Wunder Hachem
•	Débora Simões da Silva
•	Diego Nogueira
•	Eduardo Biacchi Gomes
•	Emerson Gabardo
•	Eneida Desiree Salgado
•	Estela B. Sacristán
•	Felipe Klein Gussoli
•	Fernanda Akemi Okazaki Guerios
•	Fernanda Lissa Fujiwara Homma
•	Gabriel Morettini e Castella
•	Geovane Couto da Silveira
•	Guilherme Henrique Hamada
•	Gustavo Justino de Oliveira
•	Gustavo Marques Krelling 
•	 João Pedro Kostin Felipe de Natividade
•	 José Joaquim Neto
•	 José Osório do Nascimento Neto 
•	 Juliana Georges Khouri
•	Karoline Strapasson
•	Lara Pastorello Panachuk
•	Leonardo Queiroz Leite
•	Lilian Juliana Kuwano Buhrer
•	Luciana Proceke Tambosi
•	Luiz Alberto Blanchet
•	Luzardo Faria
•	Maria Clarice Sacchelli Moraes Piotto
•	Marina Batisti
•	Ramón Huapaya Tapia
•	Regeane Bransin Quetes
•	Renan Guedes Sobreira
•	Richard Albert
•	Rodrigo Augusto Lazzari Lahoz
•	Roseana Cilião Sacchelli
•	Samia Yasmim Yousseif Duque Regniel
•	Suzana Maria Rossetti
•	Tailaine Cristina Costa
•	Tarso Cabral Violin
•	Tatiana Denczuk
•	Thiago Priess Valiati
•	Tuany Baron de Vargas
•	Vivian Lima López Valle
EFICIÊNCIA E ÉTICA NA 
ADMINISTRAÇÃO PÚBLICA
COORDENADORES 
Luiz Alberto Blanchet
Daniel Wunder Hachem
Ana Claudia Santano
prefácio de Emerson Gabardo 
Anais do Seminário Internacional realizado no Programa de Pós-Graduação 
em Direito da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná
CONSELHO EDITORIAL
Blanchet, Luiz Alberto (coord)
B641	 	 	 	 Eficiência	 e	 ética	 na	 administração	 pública:	 Anais	 do	 Seminário	 Internacional	
realizado	 no	 Programa	 de	 Pós-Graduação	 em	Direito	 da	 Pontifícia	 Universidade	
Católica	do	Paraná	/coordenação	de	Luiz	Alberto	Blanchet,	Daniel	Wunder	Hachem,	
Ana	Claudia	Santano	–	Curitiba:	Íthala,	2015.
	 412p.;	23cm
ISBN	978-85-5544-018-2	
1.	Administração	pública.	2.	Eficiência.	3.	Ética.	I.	Hachem,	Daniel	
Wunder	(coord.).	II.	Santano,	Ana	Claudia	(coord.).	III.	Título.
CDD	351	(22.ed)
CDU	35
Informamos	que	é	de	inteira	responsabilidade	dos	autores	a	emissão	de	conceitos	publicados	na	obra.	Nenhu-
ma	parte	desta	publicação	poderá	ser	reproduzida	por	qualquer	meio	ou	forma	sem	a	prévia	autorização	da	
Editora	Íthala.	A	violação	dos	direitos	autorais	é	crime	estabelecido	na	Lei	nº	9.610/98	e	punido	pelo	art.	184	
do	Código	Penal.
Ana Claudia Santano: Doutora	e	Mestre	em	Ciências	
Jurídicas	e	Políticas	pela	Universidad	de	Salamanca,	Es-
panha.	Pós-doutoranda	em	Direito	Público	Econômico	
pela	PUC/PR.	Professora	de	diversos	cursos	de	pós-gra-
duação	no	Brasil	e	exterior.	
Emerson Gabardo: Professor	de	Direito	Administra-
tivo	da	Universidade	Federal	do	Paraná.	Professor	de	
Direito	Econômico	da	Pontifícia	Universidade	Católica	
do	Paraná.	Pós-doutor	em	Direito	Público	Comparado	
pela	Fordham	University.
Fernando Gama de Miranda Netto: Doutor	em	Direito	
pela	UGF/RJ.	Professor	Adjunto	de	Direito	Processual	da	
Universidade	Federal	Fluminense	e	membro	do	corpo	
permanente	 do	 Programa	 de	Mestrado	 e	 Doutorado	
em	Sociologia	e	Direito	(UFF).
Ligia Maria Silva Melo de Casimiro:	Mestre	em	Di-
reito	do	Estado	pela	PUC/SP.	Professora	da	Faculdade	
Paraíso	–	FAP,	em	Juazeiro	do	Norte-CE,	de	graduação	
e	pós	graduação.	Professora	substituta	da	Universida-
de	Regional	do	Cariri	–	URCA,	professora	colaborado-
ra	do	Instituto	Romeu	Felipe	Bacellar	desde	2006,	em	
Curitiba/PR.
Luiz Fernando Casagrande Pereira: Doutor	e	Mestre	
em	Direito	pela	UFPR.	Coordenador	da	pós-graduação	
em	Direito	Eleitoral	da	Universidade	Positivo.	Autor	de	
livros	e	artigos	de	processo	civil	e	direito	eleitoral.
Rafael Santos de Oliveira:	 Doutor	 em	 Direito	 pela	
UFSC.	Mestre	e	Graduado	em	Direito	pela	UFSM.	Pro-
fessor	 na	 graduação	 e	 pós-graduação	 em	Direito	 da	
UFSM.	Coordenador	do	Curso	de	Direito	da	UFSM.	Edi-
tor	da	Revista	Direitos	Emergentes	na	Sociedade	Global	
e	da	Revista	Eletrônica	do	Curso	de	Direito	da	UFSM.	
Informação	bibliográfica	deste	livro,	conforme	a	NBR	6023:2002	 
da	Associação	Brasileira	de	Normas	Técnicas	(ABNT):
BLANCHET,	Luiz	Alberto;	HACHEM,	Daniel	Wunder;	SANTANO,	Ana	Claudia	(Coord.).	Eficiência e Ética na 
Administração Pública:	Anais	do	Seminário	Internacional	realizado	no	Programa	de	Pós-Graduação	em	Di-
reito	da	Pontifícia	Universidade	Católica	do	Paraná.	Curitiba:	Íthala,	2015.	412	p.	ISBN	978-85-5544-018-2.
Editora	Íthala	Ltda.
Rua	Aureliano	Azevedo	da	Silveira,	49
Bairro	São	João
82030-040	–	Curitiba	–	PR
Fone:	+55	(41)	3093-5252
Fax:	+55	(41)	3093-5257
http://www.ithala.com.br	
E-mail:	editora@ithala.com.br
Capa:	Duilio	David	Scrok
Projeto	Gráfico	e	Diagramação:	Duilio	David	Scrok
197
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT*
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Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. The difficulty of constitutional amendment in the United States; 2.1. Amen-
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Seventeenth Amendment today; 5. Conclusion; 6. References.
1. Introduction
As hard as it is today to formally amend the United States Constitution—and empirical 
studies confirm that it is one of the hardest, if not the hardest, to amend in the democratic 
world1—the United States Constitution was once thought too easy to amend. During the Pro-
gressive Era, a period of significant social activism and institutional reform from the 1890s 
through the 1920s, political actors in the United States adopted four constitutional amend-
ments in a short span of roughly 10 years: the Sixteenth Amendment, authorizing a direct 
income tax2; the Seventeenth Amendment, establishing direct elections to the United States 
* I am grateful to the Organizing Committee for inviting me to participate in this international conference, a welcome 
opportunity to explore new lines of inquiry in my research on constitutional change. I thank the conference participants 
for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay.
** Associate Professor at Boston College Law School (Boston, USA), where he specializes in constitutional law and 
comparative constitutional law. Visiting Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University (2015-16). 
Juris Doctor – J.D. (Yale University); Bachelor of Civil Law – B.C.L. (Oxford University); Master of Laws – LL.M. 
(Harvard University). In 2010, he received the Hessel Yntema Prize, which is given annually to a scholar under the age 
of 40 to recognize “the most outstanding article” on comparative law. Richard Albert is Book Reviews Editor for the 
peer-reviewed American Journal of Comparative Law, an elected member of the International Academy of Comparative 
Law, an elected member of the Executive Committee of the American Society of Comparative Law, a member of the 
Governing Council of the International Society of Public Law, a Distinguished Academic Associate at the Centre for 
Law and Religion at Cardiff Law School, a Senior Research Fellow at the Council for Canadian Democracy, and a 
founding editor of I-CONnect, the new scholarly blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law (I-CON). E-mail: 
richard.albert@bc.edu. 
1 See infra Section 2.2.
2 U.S. Const., amend. XVI (1913).
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Senate3; the Eighteenth Amendment, imposing prohibition4; and the Nineteenth Amendment, 
constitutionalizing women’s suffrage.5 
In this Essay prepared for a conference on corruption and institutional design in com-
parative perspective, I explore the impetus for the Seventeenth Amendment, which was in 
large measure driven by an effort to curb corruption in senatorial elections. The Amendment 
altered the way political candidates are selected for the United States Senate, moving from 
indirect to direct elections. Under the original terms of the Constitution, senatorial appoint-
ments were made by state legislative vote,6 but in 1913 the Seventeenth Amendment required 
that the people of each state elect their senators by popular vote.7 It took less than one year 
to ratify the Amendment, no small feat given that formally amending the United States Cons-
titution requires the approval of two-thirds of the Congress to propose an amendment and 
three-quarters of the states to ratify it.8 
I begin, in Part II, by exploring the difficulty of formal amendment in the United States. 
I explain the rules of formal amendment and I review briefly the empirical literature suggesting 
that the United States Constitution is one of the world’s most difficult to amend, if not the 
most difficult. In Part III, I discuss the Progressive Era, a period of time during which formal 
amendment seemed much easier than it is today. I review the movement and its purposes, 
and I situate the four Progressive Era amendments. In Part IV, I focus on one of these four 
amendments, the Seventeenth, and consider the motivations driving its adoption as well as 
current critiques about its effectiveness. Today, one hundred years since its entrenchment, 
the Seventeenth Amendment has attracted some dissidents proposing to repeal it, calling for 
a return to the pre-Amendment senatorial amendment rule of indirect election. The challenge 
for these opponents, however, is that it is much harder today to amend the Constitution than 
it was when it was first adopted. I conclude by questioning whether repealing the Seventeenth 
Amendment would necessarily reinstate indirect senatorial elections as a matter of practice, 
whatever it would mean as a matter of formal law. This Essay is part of a larger scholarly pro-
ject aimed at understanding the evolving perception and reality of formal amendment difficulty 
in the United States. It is an exploratory set of reflections not intended to present definitive 
answers but rather to trace lines of future inquiry.
3 U.S. Const., amend. XVII (1913).
4 U.S. Const., amend. XVIII (1919). 
5 U.S. Const., amend. XIX (1920).
6 U.S. Const., art. I, § 3, cl. 1. (1789).
7 U.S. Const., amend. XVII (1913). The Amendment also establishes a procedure to fill Senate vacancies. See ibid.
8 U.S. Const., art. V (1789). Article V also sketches a way for constitutional amendment by constitutional convention. 
But this process has not yet been successfully used under the present Constitution. See FISCH, William B. Constitu-
tional Referendum in the United States of America, American Journal Comparative Law (supplement), Ann Arbor, vol. 
54, n.4 p.485, 490-491, 2006. p. 490.
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2. The difficulty of constitutional amendment in the United States
Studies of amendment difficulty confirm what scholars have long suspected: the Uni-
ted States Constitution is one of the world’s most difficult, if not the most difficult, to for-
mally amend.9 The rigidity of the Constitution today derives both from the design of formal 
amendment rules entrenched in the constitutional text and from sources external to the text, 
including the geographic expansion of the Union since the adoption of the Constitution and 
the polarization of political parties. Amending the United States Constitution today is so hard 
that it might well be impossible.
2.1 Amending the United States Constitution
There are two steps to formally amend the Constitution: proposal by a two-thirds 
supermajority and ratification by a three-quarters supermajority.10 Article V assigns each 
of these two tasks to different institutions—the Congress, the states, and state or national 
constitutional conventions—and pairs these two tasks in various ways to create four separa-
te methods of formal amendment. First, two-thirds of Congress may propose an amendment 
and three-quarters of the states may then ratify it by constitutional conventions. Second, 
two-thirds of Congress may propose an amendment and three-quarters of the states may 
ratify it by state legislative vote. Third, two-thirds of the states may petition Congress to 
call a constitutional convention to propose an amendment and three-quarters of the states 
may then ratify it by constitutional conventions. Fourth, two-thirds of the states may petition 
Congress to call a constitutional convention to propose an amendment and three-quarters of 
the states may ratify it by state legislative vote. In all cases, Congress chooses the method of 
ratification, whether by state legislative vote or state convention.
Congresspersons have introduced thousands of amendments but only thirty-three 
have satisfied the two-thirds congressional supermajority requirement to officially propose 
an amendment to the states.11 Of those, only twenty-seven have met the three-quarters ra-
tification threshold to entrench the proposed amendment into the text of Constitution. The 
most recent formal amendment was ratified in 1992, having been first proposed by Con-
gress and transmitted to the states two hundred years earlier in 1789. The Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment prohibits Congress from giving itself a salary raise until an intervening election 
has been held.12 Given this long delay between the proposal and ratification, some scholars 
9 See infra Section 2.2.
10 U.S. Const., art. V (1789).
11 SULLIVAN, Kathleen M. Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever. Cardozo 
Law Review. New York, v. 17, n. 3, p. 691-704,  jan. 1996. p. 692.
12 U.S. Const., amend. XXVII (1992).
200
RICHARD ALBERT
have raised doubts as to the validity of the amendment,13 all to no avail.14 The Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment, the next-most recent amendment ratified twenty years earlier in 1971, fixes the 
voting age in federal and state elections at 18 years old, the same age at which the military 
draft applies.15 Prior to 1970, formal amendment appears to have been more frequent: the 
first fifteen amendments were ratified from 1789 to 1870; from 1871 to 1933, there were six; 
and from 1934 to 1970, there were four. 
The extraordinarily onerous formal amendment rules and the infrequency of modern 
formal amendment have prompted scholars to suggest that Article V is virtually impossible to 
use. Bruce Ackerman, for example, has referred to Article V as an ‘obsolescent obstacle cou-
rse’.16 Sanford Levinson argues that Article V ‘mak[es] it functionally impossible to amend 
the Constitution with regard to anything controversial’.17 Richard Primus sees the possibility 
of formal amendment as ‘generally remote’.18 Joel Colón-Ríos and Allan Hutchinson call Ar-
ticle V ‘one of the most demanding constitutional amendment processes in the world’.19 And 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy has argued that ‘the supermajoritarian requirements of Article V are so 
onerous as to be arguably undemocratic, by making it much too easy for minorities to veto 
constitutional amendments’.20
What makes Article V so difficult to successfully use is more than just its design requi-
ring supermajorities at both the proposal and ratification stages. It is also that the geographic 
expansion of the Union has exacerbated amendment difficulty by increasing the denominator 
for Article V amendments from thirteen in 1789 to fifty since 1967. Nearly quadrupling the 
13 See, e.g., KENNEDY, Christopher M. Is There a Twenty-Seventh Amendment: The Unconstitutionality of a New 
203-Year-Old Amendment. Marshall Law Review. Chicago, v. 26, n. 4, p. 977-1019, jul./sept. 1993; LEVINSON, 
Sanford. Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported Twenty-Seventh Amendment. Constitutional Commentary. 
Saint Paul, v. 11, n. 1, p. 101-113, dec./feb. 1994; SPOTTS, JoAnne D. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment: A Late 
Bloomer or a Dead Horse? The Georgia State University Law Review. Atlanta, v. 10, n. 2, p. 337-365,    jan.1994; 
STRICKLAND, Ruth Ann. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment and Constitutional Change by Stealth. PS: Political Science 
& Politics. New York, v. 26, n. 4, p. 716-722, dec. 1993; ALSTYNE, William Van. What do you Think About the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment? Constitutional Commentary.  Williamsburg, v. 10, n. 1, p. 9-18, nov. 1993.
14 Congress did not contest the validity of the amendment, see MCGREAL, Paul E. There is no Such Thing as Textua-
lism: A Case Study in Constitutional Method. Fordham Law Review. New York, v. 69, n. 6, p. 2393-2469, may 2001. 
p. 2431. Nor did the Department of Justice, see Memorandum Opinion for Counsel to the President, 16 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 87 (Nov. 2, 1992), and a federal court declined to hear a challenge to it. See Boehner v. Anderson, 809 F. 
Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1992)
15 Idem. at amend. XXVI (1971).
16 ACKERMAN, Bruce A. Transformative Appointments. Havard Law Review. Cambridge, vol. 101, n. 6, p. 1164-1184, 
apr. 1988. p. 1183.
17 LEVINSON, Sanford. How I Lost my Constitutional Faith. Maryland Law Review. Prince George's, v. 71, n. 4, p. 
956-977, oct. 2012. p. 969.
18 PRIMUS, Richard A. When Should Original Meanings Matter? Michigan Law Review. Ann Arbor, vol. 107, n. 2, p. 
165-222, 2008. p. 211.
19 COLÓN-RÍOS, Joel; HUTCHINSON, Allan. Democracy and Revolution: An Enduring Relationship? Denver University 
Law Review. Denver, v. 89, n. 3, p. 593-611, jul./sept. 2012. p. 602.
20 GOLDSWORTHY, Jeffrey. Constitutional Cultures, Democracy, and Unwritten Principles. University of Illinois Law 
Review. Champaign, v. 18, n. 2, p. 683-710, apr. 2012. p. 694.
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denominator for the three-quarters requirement for state ratification has made it much harder to 
formally amend the Constitution, as Rosalind Dixon explains: ‘On one calculation, if one were 
to try to adjust for this change in the denominator for Article V, the functional equivalent to the 
75% super-majority requirement adopted by the framers would in fact now be as low as 62%’.21 
In addition, the deepening political polarization in American society in general and specifically 
between the two dominant political parties has raised barriers to political agreement on fun-
damental changes.22 This political polarization has increased amendment difficulty, making it 
harder to gather the supermajorities required both to propose and ratify an amendment.
As hard as it is to formally amend the United States Constitution, it is not as rigid as 
it could be. The Constitution does not entrench a formally unamendable constitutional pro-
vision, as do many of the world’s democratic constitutions.23 The United States Constitution 
entrenches two provisions that once were temporarily unamendable, until the year 1808, but 
this unamendability has since expired and no longer constrains constitutional amendment.24 
The Constitution does, however, entrench a form of unamendability that I have called ‘cons-
tructive unamendability’, a reference to a non-textual form of unamendability that derives not 
from an outright prohibition on amendment but rather from a political climate that makes it 
practically impossible to assemble the supermajorities needed to propose and ratify a cons-
titutional amendment.25 The paradigmatic case of a constructively unamendable provision in 
the United States is the Equal Suffrage Clause, which guarantees that ‘no State, without its 
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate’.26 It is unlikely that a state would 
ever agree to diminish its representation in the United States Senate. Hence the clause’s 
unamendability. It is important to stress, however, that constructive unamendability is not 
permanent; a constitutional provision may flow into and out of constructive unamendability 
over time in light of the prevailing political climate.
2.2 Empirical studies of amendment difficulty
Scholars have undertaken empirical studies to measure the difficulty of formal amend-
ment. The leading study at the moment, by Donald Lutz, measures amendment difficulty in 
21 DIXON, Rosalind. Partial Constitutional Amendments. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law. 
Philadelphia, v. 13, n. 3, p. 643-685, mar. 2011. p 653..
22 See KYVIG, David E. Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995. Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1996. p. 426; PILDES, Richard H. Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized 
Democracy in America. California Law Review. Berkeley, v. 99, n. 2. p. 273-333, apr. 2011. p. 332-33; LEVINSON, 
Daryl J.; PILDES, Richard H. Separation of Parties, Not Powers. Harvard Law Review. Cambridge, v. 119, n. 8, p. 
2311-2386, june 2006. p. 2333.
23 See ALBERT, Richard. The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules. Wake Forest Law Review. v. 49, p. 913-
975, nov. 2014. p. 950-52.
24 See ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V. Boston University Law Review, 
Boston, vol. 94, n. 3, p. 1029-1082, may 2014. p. 1041-42.
25 See ALBERT, Richard. Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States. Supreme Court Law Review, 
v. 67, n. 2, p. 181-219, jan. 2014. p. 181-196..
26 U.S. Const., art. V.
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thirty-two democratic constitutions.27 Lutz begins by quantifying the difficulty of each dis-
crete step formal amendment procedures—Lutz identifies 68 possible steps from initiation 
through final assent—and then assigns a total value for a constitution’s amendment difficulty 
by aggregating the sum of each step.28 Lutz concludes that the United States Constitution 
is the world’s most difficult to amend, ranked first with a total score of 5.10, well above the 
next-most difficult constitutions to amend, the Swiss and Venezuelan Constitutions, each tied 
with a score of 4.75.29 There are some limitations to the Lutz study, but it nonetheless seems 
to support what scholars have long believed: that the United States Constitution is among the 
world’s most rigid constitutions.30
There are other empirical studies, albeit less prominent ones, of amendment difficulty. 
Astrid Lorenz has a published a study measuring amendment difficulty in 39 constitutional 
democracies, concluding that the United States Constitution ranks second behind Belgium.31 
Arend Lijphart has published his own classification of amendment difficulty, a four-category 
ranking of 36 democratic constitutions according to the kinds of majorities required to for-
mally amend the constitution.32 In Lijphart’s classification, the United States ranks in the top 
group for amendment difficulty along with Australia, Canada, Japan and Switzerland.33
Measuring amendment difficulty is itself difficult, however. As Tom Ginsburg and Ja-
mes Melton have argued, convincingly I believe, amendment culture may be more important 
in quantifying how difficult it is to formally amend a constitution than assigning a value to 
various steps involved in the amendment process.34 By ‘amendment culture’, Ginsburg and 
Melton mean the relative frequency and success of constitutional amendment and generally 
how the practice of constitutional amendment is perceived by those governed by the ru-
les themselves.35 Christopher Eisgruber makes this point about the difficulty of measuring 
amendment difficulty in the United States under the rules of Article V: ‘their impact will turn 
upon a number of cultural considerations, such as the extent to which state politics differ 
27 LUTZ, Donald S. Principles of Constitutional Design. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. p. 166-77.
28 LUTZ, Donald S. Idem. Ibidem. 
29 LUTZ, Donald S. Idem. p. 170.
30 One notable limitation is that Lutz did not include Canada in his study. The reason why, he explains, is that he found 
it difficult to identify what possesses ‘constitutional status’ in the country, and therefore what is subject to change by 
formal amendment. LUTZ, Donald S. Idem. p. 179 n. 6. Elsewhere, I have argued that the Constitution of Canada is 
more difficult to amend than the United States Constitution, and that Canada would have ranked above the United Sta-
tes had Lutz included Canada in his study sample. See ALBERT, Richard. The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment 
in Canada. Alberta Law Review. Edmonton, v. 52, n. 5.  No prelo. 
31 LORENZ, Astrid. How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity. Journal of Theoretical Politics. [s.l.], v. 17, n. 3, p. 339-
361,  july 2005. p. 358-59.
32 LIJPHART, Arend. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. p. 220.
33 LIJPHART, Arend. Idem. Ibidem.
34 See GINSBURG, Tom; MELTON, James. Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cul-
tures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty. Chicago Working Papers on Law and Economics. Chi-
cago, n. 682, p. 1-29, may 2014.
35 GINSBURG, Tom; MELTON, James. Idem.
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from national politics and the extent to which people are receptive to or skeptical about the 
general idea of constitutional amendment’.36 Despite the challenge of measuring amendment 
difficulty, no one will disagree that the constitutional structure and politics of Article V make 
the United States Constitution very difficult to amend.
3. Constitutional Amendment in the Progressive Era
But the United States Constitution was not always thought difficult to amend. In the 
1910s, political actors proposed and ratified a series of four constitutional amendments in 
rapid succession. This burst of amendment activity prompted William Marbury, writing at 
the end of the decade, to suggest that the Constitution had become too easy to amend, a 
departure from the prevailing belief at the time, not unlike what it is today, that the Constitution 
was very difficult to amend: ‘Until lately, it appears never to have occurred to any one in this 
country that there need be any fear that the Constitution could be too readily amended’, ob-
served Marbury, referencing the outdated view that ‘on the contrary, the prevailing impression 
was that it was almost impossible to amend that great instrument, except by something in 
the nature of a revolution’.37 But the four amendments disrupted the conventional view of the 
difficulty of formal amendment in the United States. The ease of formal amendment then and 
its difficulty today suggest that amendment difficulty is variable across time, driven by the 
particularities of the moment, by the consolidation and disintegration of political forces, and 
also by the evolution of norms. The impetus behind the amendability of the Constitution in the 
1910s was the progressive movement.
3.1 The movement and its purposes
Although scholars refer to the group engaged in promoting social change in American 
society from the 1890s to the 1920s as the “progressive movement,” the truth is that the ob-
jectives pursued and the advancements achieved during this period were driven by a complex 
aggregation of agents and forces that defy such simple shorthand. It is nonetheless possible 
to identify the three objectives, broadly stated, that define what came to be known as the 
progressive movement: improving the exercise and tools of democracy, using government to 
help those in need, and curbing the influence of privileged interests. A leading analysis of the 
time sums it up as follows:
In this widespread political agitation that at first sight seems so incoherent and chao-
tic, there may be distinguished upon examination and analysis three tendencies. The 
first of these tendencies is found in the insistence by the best men in all political 
parties that special, minority, and corrupt influence in government—national, state, 
and city—be removed; the second tendency is found in the demand that the structure 
36 EISGRUBER, Christopher L. Constitutional Self-Government. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. p. 22.
37 MARBURY, William L. The Limitations upon the Amendment Power. Harvard Law Review. Cambridge, v. 33, n. 2, p. 
223-235, dec. 1919. p. 223.
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or machinery of government, which has hitherto been admirably adapted to control 
by the few, be so changed and modified that it will be more difficult for the few, and 
easier for the many, to control; and, finally, the third tendency is found in the rapidly 
growing conviction that the functions of government at present are too restricted and 
that they must be increased and extended to relieve social and economic distress. 
These three tendencies with varying emphasis are seen to-day in the platform and 
program of every political party; they are manifested in the political changes and 
reforms that are advocated and made in the nation, the states, and the cities; and, 
because of their universality and definiteness, they may be said to constitute the real 
progressive movement.38
The movement declined in the 1920s and ultimately lost its momentum. One of the 
movement’s amendments, the Eighteenth, was repealed in 1933, fourteen years after it had 
been adopted in 1919.39 The movement had never found the right political vehicle to formalize 
its program, nor could progressives even agree on a common program, perhaps as a result of 
the tensions among progressives themselves and the lack of a national leader or an organized 
structure of leadership.40
But the movement has left a legacy that continues to shape American politics today. 
Concern about special interest control of public institutions led the movement to promote 
direct democracy in its many forms, including the ballot initiative, the popular referendum and 
the recall power.41 Reformers wanted to reduce the power of elites in the electoral process.42 
The common denominator in these three devices, as Nathaniel Persily writes, was ‘the dele-
gation of political decisions to the ordinary voter’.43 South Dakota was the first state to adopt 
the initiative and the referendum in 1898.44 Roughly 20 other states followed suit from 1900 
through 1918 as direct democracy grew in popularity and as progressives won an important 
victory on the constitutionality of direct democracy in the United States Supreme Court.45 The 
Court held that federal constitutional challenges to state constitutional provisions authorizing 
the initiative or referendum are non-justiciable political questions over which the Court has 
no jurisdiction.46 
38 WITT, Benjamin Parke De. The Progressive Movement. New York: MacMillan, 1915. p. 4-5.
39 U.S. Const., amend. XXI (1933).
40 See LINK, Arthur S. What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920’s? American Historical Review. 
Oxford, v. 64, n. 4, p. 833-851, oct. 1959. p. 842.
41 EULE, Julian N. Judicial Review of Direct Democracy. Yale Law Journal. New Haven, v. 99, p. 1503-1558, may 
1990. p. 1546.
42 HENRETTA, James A. Foreword: Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition. Rutgers Law Journal. Camden, v. 22. 
p. 819-839, 1991. p. 824. 
43 PERSILY, Nathaniel A. The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum and Recall 
Developed in the American West. Michigan Law & Policy Review. Ann Arbor, v. 2, p. 11-41, jan. 1997. p. 13. 
44 See MAGLEBY, David B. Taking the Initiative: Direct Legislation and Direct Democracy in the 1980s. PS: Political 
Science & Politics. New York, v. 21, n. 3, p. 600-611, jul./sept. 1988. p. 602.
45 See MILLER, Kenneth P. Direct Democracy and the Courts. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. p. 34-36.
46 Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
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3.2 The progressive amendments
Part of the legacy of the Progressive Era also includes constitutional amendments. In 
a span of roughly ten years, political actors entrenched four constitutional amendments. In 
1909, Congress passed the Sixteenth Amendment, authorizing an income tax, and the states 
ratified it four years later in 1913; in 1912, Congress passed the Seventeenth Amendment, 
establishing direct elections to the United States Senate, and the states ratified it the next year 
in 1913; in 1917, Congress passed the Eighteenth Amendment, which imposed prohibition, 
and the states ratified it two years later in 1919; and in 1919, Congress passed the Nineteenth 
Amendment, prohibiting gender discrimination in the right to vote, and the states ratified it just 
over one year later in 1920.47 
David Strauss has argued that these four amendments simply formalized changes that 
had already become political facts. He may be right but these amendments still show how 
important a period of social change the Progressive Era was for the country, which Strauss 
himself recognizes.48 Akhil Amar situates these progressive amendments along a ‘demo-
cratizing trendline’49 that ‘call[s] dramatic attention to the arc of history,’50 as Americans 
amended the Constitution to authorize progressive income taxation and the direct election of 
Senators, and to enfranchise women.51 Not all progressives supported prohibition but ‘the 
various strands of progressivism were united, however, at the level of basic assumptions’.52 
James Timberlake has connected the Eighteenth Amendment to the larger effort to limit the 
corrupting influence of the liquor industry.53 Alan Grimes refers to these four as ‘the western 
amendments’ because they arose from what he sees as a ‘struggle [that] pitted the West, for 
the most part the last eighteen of the forty-eight states in the Union, against the states that 
had grown out of the initial thirteen colonies’.54 He situates these amendments in the conflict 
between ‘urban and rural constituencies’, ‘industrial and agrarian interests’, and ‘boss-orien-
ted politics and chautauqua-style politics’.55
47 See The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitu-
tion_amendments_11-27.html (last accessed September 1, 2015).
48 See STRAUSS, David A. The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments. Harvard Law Review. Cambridge, v. 114, 
n. 5, p.1457-1460, mar. 2001.
49 AMAR, Akhil Reed. America’s Constitution: A Biography. New York: Random House, 2005. p. 412.
50 AMAR, Akhil Reed. Idem. p. 685.
51 AMAR, Akhil Reed. Idem. Ibidem.
52 KYVIG, David E. Repealing National Prohibition. Kent: The Kent State University Press, 2000. p. 8. 
53 See TIMBERLAKE, James H. Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, 1900-1920. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1963.
54 GRIMES, Alan P. Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1978. p. 66.
55 GRIMES, Alan P. Idem. Ibidem.
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Today, perhaps the most controversial of these progressive amendments is the Seven-
teenth. Scholars have called for its repeal,56 as have political actors,57 most notably current 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who, when asked what he would change about the 
United States Constitution answered that ‘there’s very little that I would change’ although the 
Seventeenth Amendment is one of the few items he would change if he could, as he explained 
in a public forum:
I would change [the Constitution] back to what they wrote, in some respects. The 
Seventeenth Amendment has changed things enormously. … We changed that in 
a burst of progressivism in 1913, and you can trace the decline of so-called states’ 
rights throughout the rest of the 20th century. So, don’t mess with the Constitution.58
Justice Scalia’s criticism of the Seventeenth Amendment is anchored in federalism. 
The critique has its strongest voice in Ralph Rossum, who had earlier suggested that the 
Amendment effectively repealed federalism by removing an important state check on the 
national government. Rossum argued that federalism, at least as it was understood by the 
authors of the Constitution, ‘effectively died as a result of the social and political forces that 
resulted in the adoption and ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment’.59 In the next Part, I 
focus not on this aspect of the Amendment but rather on a narrower inquiry into its corrup-
tion-fighting origins. I will then explore the bases for the calls today to repeal the Seventeenth 
Amendment.
4. The Seventeenth Amendment
The Seventeenth Amendment changed how political candidates are selected for the 
United States Senate. The senatorial selection process was once indirect but it is now direct: 
no longer are senators chosen by state legislatures; senators are now elected directly by 
voters in each state. Under the original design of the Constitution, the senatorial appointments 
rule required that ‘The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from 
each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one 
56 See, e.g., C.H. HOEBEKE, C.H. The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the Seventeenth Amendment. 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995; BARNETT, Randy. The Case for the Repeal Amendment. Tennessee Law 
Review. Knoxville, v. 78, n. 12, p. 813-822, mar. 2011; ZYWICKI, Todd J. Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The 
History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals. The Cleveland State Law 
Review. v. 45, n. 2,  p. 165-234, mar./may 1997.
57 See, e.g., SEITZ-WALD, Alex. Repeal the 17th Amendment! Salon. Available at: http://www.salon.com/2012/08/16/
repeal_the_17th_amendment (last accessed September 1, 2015 JOHNSON, Keith. Anti-Washington Ire Kindles an 
Old Debate. Wall Street Journal. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304879604575582
192395853212 (last accessed September 1, 2015); BAI, Matt. Tea Party’s Push on Senate Election Exposes Limits. 
N.Y. Times, June 1, 2010, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/us/politics/02bai.html (last accessed 
September 1, 2015).
58 ‘Scalia, Breyer Spar Over Supreme Court Issues’, Associated Press, November 12, 2010, available at: http://www.
foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/12/scalia-breyer-spar-supreme-court-issues (last accessed September 1, 2015).
59 ROSSUM, Ralph A. Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment: The Irony of Constitutional 
Democracy. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001. p. 3.
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Vote’.60 But, in 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment changed the appointments rule, and since 
then it requires that ‘The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators 
from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have 
one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the 
most numerous branch of the State legislatures’.61 The amendment did not take long to ratify. 
Congress approved it on May 13, 1912, and three-quarters of the states had ratified it less 
than a year later by April 8, 1913.62
The rapid ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment might suggest that political ac-
tors devoted little deliberation to it. But moving from indirect to direct senatorial elections 
had been a subject of national political interest for almost one hundred years prior. In 1826, 
a congressperson introduced an amendment to create direct elections for senators; this was 
followed by a similar proposal in 1835, and five more between 1850 and 1855.63 Later in 
1860, Andrew Johnson, then a senator but later president, renewed the calls for direct sena-
torial elections that he had earlier made as a member of the House of Representatives.64 As 
president, Johnson continued to press for the change, sending a special message to Con-
gress on the subject in 1868 and taking the position again in his State of the Union address 
that same year.65 At the time, however, the nation was occupied with Reconstruction and as a 
result, as George Haynes writes, ‘even if President Johnson’s advocacy had been calculated 
to commend the measure to the favorable attention of Congress, little room was left for con-
sideration of such a change in the Constitution’.66
Public interest in moving from indirect to direct senatorial elections began to grow 
quickly shortly thereafter. There were more and more congressional resolutions and amend-
ment proposals,67 citizens and associations took up the cause, and state and national political 
parties made Senate reform part of their platform.68 State legislatures, too, began pushing for 
the amendment, with California and Iowa, as early as 1874, petitioning Congress to amend 
the Constitution to create direct senatorial elections.69 By 1902, three states had held separate 
referenda asking voters whether they would prefer direct senatorial elections, and in each 
case the vote was overwhelmingly in favor the change: 451,319 to 76,975 in Illinois in 1902; 
60 U.S. Const., art. I, § 3, cl. 1. (1789).
61 U.S. Const., amend. XVII (1913). The amendment also establishes a procedure to fill Senate vacancies. See ibid.
62 See The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitu-
tion_amendments_11-27.html (last accessed September 1, 2015).
63 See HAYNES, George H. The Election of Senators. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1912. p. 101-102.
64 HAYNES, George H. Idem. p. 102.
65 HAYNES, George H. Idem. Ibidem. 
66 HAYNES, George H. Idem. Ibidem. 
67 HAYNES, George H. Idem. p. 103-04.
68 HAYNES, George H. Idem. p. 105.
69 HAYNES, George H. Idem. p. 106.
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187,958 to 13,342 in California in 1892; and 6,775 to 866 in Nevada in 1983.70 By 1905, 31 
state legislatures had in some way communicated to Congress its support for direct sena-
torial elections.71 Yet, even this number, as high as it was, did not reflect the full measure of 
state support because many states had already adopted state laws requiring direct senatorial 
election.72 
 In 1906, 29 delegates from 11 states gathered in Iowa at what was called the 
Inter-State Senatorial Amendment Convention, an effort to accelerate the change that most 
states by then supported.73 The goal of the convention was to coordinate efforts to ultimately 
petition Congress to call a convention to propose an amendment to create direct senatorial 
elections.74 Although Iowans and others had long supported this idea for amending the Cons-
titution, their efforts had borne no fruit. Faced with no congressional action on an amend-
ment, the Governor of Iowa convened the event and made clear his objectives when he called 
the convention to order:
Hitherto this sentiment has not been productive or results, and during the last session 
of the General Assembly it seemed to the members who compose that body that there 
was but one effective and practical way in which to take the views of the people of 
this country upon the proposed change in the election of Senators. It was to adopt 
the other alternative provided in the Constitution of the United States, and ask our 
sister states to co-operate with us in presenting a petition to Congress that would 
require action upon the part of that body in the way of convening a constitutional 
convention.75
The convention had been authorized by a joint resolution of the Iowa General As-
sembly. The Assembly directed the Governor of Iowa to invite other governors to send re-
presentatives to the Inter-State Convention.76 The joint resolution, passed in March 1906, 
noted that seventeen states were at the time on record as petitioning Congress to approve an 
amendment proposal establishing direct senatorial elections and that seven states had by that 
time petitioned Congress to call a convention for the purpose of proposing an amendment to 
create direct senatorial elections.77
By the time Congress eventually approved the Seventeenth Amendment and trans-
mitted it to the states in 1912, over half of the states had already adopted direct senatorial 
70 HAYNES, George H. Idem. Ibidem.
71 HAYNES, George H. Idem. p. 110.
72 HAYNES, George H. Idem. p. 111.
73 Report of the Proceedings of the Inter-State Senatorial Amendment Convention, Des Moines, Iowa, December 5-6, 
1906, at 23-24.
74 Idem. at 14.
75 Idem. Ibidem
76 HAYNES, George H. The Election of Senators… Op. Cit. p. 106.
77 HAYNES, George H. Idem. at 106-08.
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elections, or something quite close to it, as a matter of either law or practice.78 For example, 
states would hold elections whose results were ‘advisory’ to the legislatures; the legislature 
of course retained the constitutional responsibility to select senators themselves, but their 
members found it difficult to ignore the results of those elections since they were essentially 
‘referenda instructing state legislators’.79 States generally took three paths toward direct se-
natorial election even before the Seventeenth Amendment was proposed and ratified: amen-
ding their constitution, passing laws, and following political practices that ‘sidestep legislative 
selection of senators’.80 These subnational approaches reflected the distinctive strategy of the 
progressive movement: to pursue change at the state level, for instance through uniform state 
legislation or by piecemeal, to make it close to inevitable at the national level.81 By 1913, at 
least 34 states had effectively evolved by law or practice to elect their senators even before it 
was required by constitutional amendment.82
4.1 The impetus for the Seventeenth Amendment
There were at least three motivations behind the move to direct senatorial elections: 
curbing corruption in state legislatures; avoiding deadlocks in senatorial elections; and giving 
greater voice to the people.83 Under the prevailing method of indirect senatorial election—
state legislators voting for the state’s United States Senators—corruption in state legislative 
elections for senators was pervasive, as observers at the time commented that the process 
‘was so corrupt that it produced an unresponsive and unrepresentative Senate’.84 State le-
gislative corruption and interest group control of senatorial elections were, as Vikram Amar 
writes, ‘perhaps the greatest evils associated with indirect election’.85 The concern was that 
indirect senatorial elections would lead senatorial candidates to promise money, favors or 
78 STRAUSS, David A. The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments… Op. Cit. p. 1497.
79 BYBEE. Jay S. Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens Song of the Seventeenth Amendment. 
Northwestern Law Review. Chicago, v. 91, n. 2, p. 500-569, sept./dec. 1997. p. 537.
80 CLOPTON, Zachary D.; ART, Steven E. The Meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment and a Century of State Defiance. 
Northwestern Law Review. Chicago, v. 107, n. 3, p. 1181-1242, mar./jun. 2013. p. 1190.
81 GRAEBNER, William. Federalism in the Progressive Era: A Structural Interpretation of Reform. The Journal of Ame-
rican History. Oxford, v. 64, n. 2, p. 331-357, sept. 1977. p. 332.
82 WIEGAND, Elva. A History of the Movement for the Direct Election of Senators. Los Angeles, 1934. Thesis (Master 
in History) - Department of History, University of Southern California. f. 49.  One of the leading models for direct se-
natorial election was the Oregon plan that invited candidates for state legislature to sign one of two statements, either 
pledging to vote for the U.S. Senate candidate who received the highest popular vote in the state or to see the vote as 
only advisory. KOBACH, Kris W. Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments. 
Yale Law Journal. New Haven,  v. 103, n. 7, p. 1971-2007, may 1994. p. 1978. 
83 BYBEE. Jay S. Ulysses at the Mast… Op. Cit. p. 538-47.
84 SCHILLER, Wendy J.; STEWART III, Charles. Electing the Senate: Indirect Democracy Before the Seventeenth 
Amendment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. p. 10.
85 AMAR, Vikram David. Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment. 
Vanderbilt Law Review. v. 49, n. 6, p. 1347-1407, nov. 1996. p. 1353.
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offices to state legislators in return for their vote.86 The corruption concern extended to state 
governments and also to influential yet unelected insiders who would pay off state lawmakers 
to direct their vote in senatorial elections.87
As the legislative history of the Seventeenth Amendment suggests,88 political actors 
believed the problem could be fixed by adopting direct senatorial elections that would give 
power directly to the people and would take it away from the corruptible state senators.89 A 
1911 report from the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary referred to the ‘instan-
ces of bribery and corruption which have taken place in the legislatures of the different States 
in the last 25 years, and which could not have occurred had popular elections prevailed’.90 
There was evidence that state legislators had sold their votes to elect senators that would not 
have otherwise been elected.91
A constitutional amendment was necessary to address the problem on a national 
scale.92 It ‘completed the centralizing process that the public canvass began’, after states 
had come onboard with their own reforms and in light of the popular support behind the idea 
of direct election.93 Despite strong evidence of corruption in seven states in the fifteen years 
preceding the successful proposal of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1912, the United States 
Senate was not keen to investigate these matters. Indeed, the Senate showed ‘extreme reluc-
tance to investigate such charges, and [] bound itself by precedents which ma[d]e not only 
the unseating of a member, but even the pursuit of a thoroughgoing investigation, practically 
impossible, except where the evidence of guild [was] overwhelming and notorious’.94 Of the 
ten senators investigated by the Senate before 1900, only two senators ultimately resigned 
their seat, though in neither case had the Senate yet taken a vote on the specific resolution 
concerning allegations of corruption.95 
It is worth recalling one corruption case. On July 13, 1912, two months after the 
Congress had approved the Seventeenth Amendment and transmitted it to the states for 
86 See TEACHOUT, Zephyr. Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin’s Snuff Box to Citizens United. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2014. p. 123.
87 AMAR, Akhil Reed. America’s Constitution: A Biography. New York: Random House, 2005. p. 412.
88 See LITTLE, Laura E. An Excursion into the Uncharted Waters of the Seventeenth Amendment. Temple Law Review. 
Philadelphia, v. 64, n. 3, p. 629-658, sept./dec. 1991. p. 640.
89 CROOK, Sara Brandes; HIBBING, John R. A Not-so-distant Mirror: The 17th Amendment and Congressional Change. 
American Political Science Review. Washington, D.C., v. 91, n. 4, p. 845-853, dec. 1997. p. 845.
90 Report No. 961 to accompany S.J. Res. 134, Committee on the Judiciary, ‘Election of Senators by Popular Vote’, 
January 11, 1911, 61st Cong. 3d Sess., at 14.
91 BYBEE. Jay S. Ulysses at the Mast… Op. Cit. p. 539.
92 HAYNES, George H. The Election of Senators… Op. Cit. p.  53.
93 RIKER, William H. The Senate and American Federalism. American Political Science Review. New York, v. 49, n. 2, 
p. 452-469, july 1955. p. 467.
94 RIKER, William H. Idem. Ibidem. 
95 RIKER, William H. Idem. p. 53-56.
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ratification, the Senate invalidated the election of Illinois Senator William Lorimer.96 Elected in 
1909 under the original process of indirect senatorial election, Lorimer had been cleared of 
the corruption charges in 1911 when the Senate dropped the matter after a six-week inquiry.97 
But when new public charges came to light a week before the Senate voted on the proposed 
Seventeenth Amendment, the Senate reopened the Lorimer case.98 Lorimer, it was proven to 
the Senate’s satisfaction, had been elected to the United States Senate with the help of at least 
seven state legislators whose votes had been bought with $100,000 raised by large Chicago 
corporations.99 In the end, four of the seven gave confessions in open court.100 This extraor-
dinary case of corruption is not representative; it appears to have been the most egregious 
example that came to light at the time.
But David Schleicher questions the corruption narrative that is thought to have promp-
ted the move from indirect to direct senatorial elections: if the corrupting forces ‘had the 
power to sneak through senators over popular worry about corruption, there needs to be an 
additional explanation for why they did not have enough power to stop direct elections—and 
in fact did not want to’.101 This is an important question and perhaps one that will remain 
unanswered, at least with any certainty. But Todd Zywicki may have an answer. The Seven-
teenth Amendment, Zywicki writes, made rent-seeking easier, allowing interest groups to 
go directly to an elected Senator rather than having to canvass an entire state legislature to 
secure a majority for their preferred candidate: ‘by making it possible for special interests to 
lobby Senators directly, rather than having to proceed through the intermediary of the state le-
gislatures, the Seventeenth Amendment reduced the costs of lobbying for wealth transfers’.102 
As the interest groups grew more national and as they sought national influence to advance 
their cause, it proved more effective to lobby one relatively small group of national leaders 
rather than several groups of state leaders: ‘because these national interest groups (such as 
labor unions and railroads) were dispersed across several states, it was quite cumbersome 
and expensive for them to have to lobbing multiple state legislatures in order to get the Senate 
consent to a piece of legislation.’103 Schleicher explains Zywicki’s answer succinctly:
96 July 13, 1912: Senator Ousted’, Senate History: 1878-1920, United States Senate, at: http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/minute/Senator_Ousted.htm (last accessed September 1, 2015).
97 Idem.
98 Idem.
99 See BUENKER, John D. Illinois and the Four Progressive-Era Amendments to the United States Constitution. Illinois 
Historical Journal. Springfield, v. 80, sept./dec. 1987. p. 215-16.
100 BUENKER, John D. Idem. at 216. The number could be higher than seven. According to another source, supporters 
of Lorimer paid bribes to forty state legislators. See GRADEL, Thomas J.; SIMPSON, Dick. Corrupt Illinois: Patronage, 
Cronyism, and Criminality. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2014. p. 42-43.
101 SCHLEICHER, David. The Seventeenth Amendment and Federalism in an Age of National Political Parties. Hastings 
Law Journal. San Francisco, v. 65, n. 4, p. 1043-1099, may 2014. p. 1060.
102 ZYWICKI, Todd J. Beyond the Shell and Husk of History… Op. Cit. p. 215.
103 ZYWICKI, Todd J. Idem. p. 216.
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[Interest groups] supported the Amendment for several reasons: it would reduce 
the cost  of lobbying for favorable legislation by national interest groups because 
lobbyists would only have to engage with one body and not fifty; it would increase 
the length of senatorial tenures, permitting interest groups to form long-term rela-
tionships with senators; and it would reduce monitoring of senators because state 
legislatures were better at ensuring that senators did the bidding of the voting public 
rather than special interest groups. National interest groups thus had an interest in 
direct elections because it made the Senate easier to lobby.104
The point, then, according to Zywicki, is that there was more to the Seventeenth 
Amendment than an effort to curb corruption. It may be that the move to direct senatorial 
elections concealed a much less-public effort to redirect rent-seeking behavior so as to make 
it more efficient for interest groups to solicit favors from the federal government.105 John Mc-
Ginnis echoes this view, arguing that the Seventeenth Amendment facilitated ‘the rise of the 
special-interest state’.106 McGinnis writes that the Amendment ‘increased monitoring costs 
and entrenched senators in office’ and ‘made it easier for interest groups to strike long-term 
deals’ because the general electorate was much less competent than state legislators at 
monitoring senators.107 Today, with the benefit of one century of political life under the Seven-
teenth Amendment, it is worth asking whether scholars believe that direct senatorial elections 
has fulfilled the objective that first drove its proposal.
4.2 The Seventeenth Amendment today
On the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of the Seventeenth Amendment, 
Wendy Schiller and Charles Stewart published a report inquiring whether the Amendment 
had fulfilled its intended objectives. The concluded that ‘the 17th Amendment has failed to 
deliver on its promise, and has produced a Senate that is even less responsive to voters than 
it was under the indirect election system’.108 The key finding concerned money in senatorial 
elections. They estimated that prior to the Seventeenth Amendment from 1871 to 1913, there 
was an average of $214.88 million per year spend on senatorial elections.109 This is roughly 
one-fifth of what was spent in the 2012 Senate election cycle: $1.168 billion.110 For Schiller 
and Stewart, this contrast undermines the Amendment: ‘Despite the blatant use of money to 
win indirect Senate elections, 100 years after the 17th Amendment was enacted, the modern 
104 SCHLEICHER, David. The Seventeenth Amendment… Op. Cit. p. 1061.
105 ZYWICKI, Todd J. Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment. Oregon 
Law Review. Eugene, v. 73, p. 1007-1055, 1994. p. 1054-55..
106 MCGINNIS, John O. The Original Constitution and its Decline: A Public Choice Perspective. Harvard Journal of Law 
& Public Policy. Cambridge, v. 21, n. 1, p. 195-210, sept./dec. 1997. p. 205.
107 MCGINNIS, John O. Idem. at 206.
108 SCHILLER, Wendy J.; STEWART III, Charles. The 100th Anniversary of the 17th Amendment: A Promise Unfulfilled. 
Issues in Governance Studies. Washington, v. 34, n. 59, p. 1-12, may 2013. p. 1.
109 SCHILLER, Wendy J.; STEWART III, Charles. Idem. p. 6-7.
110 SCHILLER, Wendy J.; STEWART III, Charles. Idem. Ibidem. 
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Senate elections process is swamped with campaign money in ways that far outpace elec-
tions under the indirect elections system’.111 A few years prior, another took a similar view of 
the Amendment but stressed more specific failures: 
In retrospect, the amendment failed to accomplish what was expected of it, and 
in most cases failed dismally. Exorbitant expenditures, alliances with well-financed 
lobby groups, and electioneering sleights-of-hand have continued to characterize 
Senate campaigns long after the constitutional nostrum was implemented. In fact, 
such tendencies have grown increasingly problematic. Insofar as the Senate also 
has participated in lavishing vast sums on federal projects of dubious value to the 
general welfare, and producing encyclopedic volumes of legislation that never will be 
read or understood by the great mass of Americans, it can hardly be the case that 
popular elections have strengthened the upper chamber’s resistance to the advances 
of special interests.112
 The rise of money in senatorial elections has not been at the core of the call to 
repeal the Seventeenth Amendment. The repeal effort has instead relied largely on federalism, 
or ‘states’ rights’, as the rallying cry behind the move to return to indirect senatorial elections. 
According to repeal proponents, doing away with direct senatorial elections would restore the 
federalist balance created by the Constitution: state legislatures would once again have the 
power to send to Washington only those senators they believed would be responsive to the 
state’s needs.113 Ted Cruz, for example, has argued that the Seventeenth Amendment was 
a ‘major step toward the explosion of federal power and the undermining of the authority of 
the states’.114 A common critique of the Amendment is that it disrupted the founding design 
of the Constitution, and that repeal would return the country to where it began and where it 
should be. One commentator, for instance, argues that a return to indirect senatorial elections 
‘would check the federal government’s proclivity to pass laws binding the state to unfunded 
mandates. It would increase the sovereignty of the several states and restore true federalism 
back into our system of government’.115
111 SCHILLER, Wendy J.; STEWART III, Charles. Idem. p. 7.
112 HOEBEKE, C.H. Democratizing the Constitution: The Failure of the Seventeenth Amendment. IX Humanitas - Na-
tional Humanities Institute, Center for Constitutional Studies. Available at: http://www.nhinet.org/hoebeke.htm (last 
accessed September 1, 2015).
113 HOEBEKE, C.H. Idem. One state senator has even called on his state legislature to rescind its ratification of the 
Seventeenth Amendment. See HACKEN, Kelsey. Rescind Seventeenth Amendment, Indiana Lawmaker Proposes. He-
artlander Magazine. Available at: http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2015/02/19/indiana-lawmaker-propo-
ses-rescinding-seventeenth-amendment (last accessed September 1, 2015).
114 GREENBLATT, Alan. Rethinking the 17th Amendment: An Old Idea Gets Fresh Opposition. NPR. Available at: http://
www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2014/02/05/271937304/rethinking-the-17th-amendment-an-old-idea-gets-fresh
-opposition (last accessed September 1, 2015).
115 See KOEHL, Theodore. How to Repeal the 16th and 17th Amendments. American Thinker. Available at: http://
www.americanthinker.com/articles/2013/07/how_to_repeal_the_16th_and_17th_amendments.html (last accessed 
September 1, 2015).
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It is worth wondering whether restoring the original method of indirect senatorial elec-
tions would have the effect that repeal advocates anticipate, that is to say a rebalancing of 
federalism. On one view, returning to indirect senatorial elections would align the tenure of 
senators to how well they defend their state’s interest rather than the national interests. It is 
also likely the case, as one observer acknowledges, that ‘senators still would be just as likely 
to be corrupted’ but it also likely that ‘the corruption would be dispersed to the 50 separate 
state legislatures’ and even then, ‘the corruption more often would be on behalf of state in-
terests’. This corruption, the same observer notes, would be remediable ‘by the vigilance of 
voters for more responsive state legislative seats (typically, about less than 50,000 residen-
ces per state legislator), rather than Senate seats (the entire population of the state—usually 
millions.)’.116 This is an honest defense of indirect senatorial elections insofar as it recognizes 
that corruption is inevitable in either case.
But it is not clear that repealing the Seventeenth Amendment would necessarily re-
instate indirect senatorial elections as a matter of practice, whatever it would mean as a 
matter of formal law. Assume the Seventeenth Amendment were repealed today. The Cons-
titution would revert to its original appointment rule, requiring state legislatures to select 
their senators. But, in my view, that direct election would nonetheless remain a political and 
legal fact of senatorial selection. The laws mandating direct senatorial elections even before 
to the Amendment, as discussed above,117 would likely be revived. It would be difficult for 
state legislators to justify denying voters their right, acquired by prior law and practice, to 
choose their own senators.118 What is perhaps more problematic for the effort to repeal the 
amendment while concurrently prohibiting voters from choosing their own senators is that 
the amendment repealing the Seventeenth would have to be designed to effectively preclude 
all the different devices state legislatures could use to promote popular election of senators. 
It would also have to be designed to preclude indirect forms of popular election, for instance 
where the state legislature would select the candidate who was ahead in public opinion polls. 
Not only would this design be difficult to perfect but it would be an unreasonable choice for 
designers to make.
5. Conclusion
It is unlikely that the effort to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment will turn grow into a 
movement like the one that first drove the Amendment’s proposal and ratification one hundred 
years ago. But even if support continues to build to repeal the Amendment, the formal amend-
ment rules of Article V will almost certainly lead to its defeat. Constitutional amendment in 
the United States is next to impossible, or at least it is today. It could of course in the future 
116  Idem. 
117 See supra Section 4.1.
118 See SPIVAK, Joshua. Don’t Repeal the 17th Amendment. Forbes.com. Available at: http://www.forbes.
com/2010/04/02/seventeenth-amendment-repeal-louie-gohmert-opinions-contributors-joshua-spivak.html (last ac-
cessed September 1, 2015).
215
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
become much less daunting, just as it became during the Progressive Era, when constitutio-
nal amendment seemed for some too easy in comparison to what it had been before. Fewer 
than thirty years before the entrenchment of the Seventeenth Amendment, Woodrow Wilson, 
writing in 1885, highlighted the difficulty of constitutional amendment under the United States 
Constitution, referring to the ‘cumbrous machinery of formal amendment erected by Article 
Five’.119
Today, political actors introduce constitutional amendments on all subjects. Con-
gresspersons introduce proposals on subjects ranging from campaign finance,120 to prayer 
in schools121 and to presidential term limits,122 and state legislatures petition Congress to 
propose amendments to repeal federal laws,123 to require a balanced budget124 and to prohibit 
abortion.125 Some of these amendments, and indeed perhaps most of them, are introduced 
for narrow parochial purposes that David Mayhew categorizes as position taking, credit clai-
ming, or advertising.126 
Perhaps the history and methods of the Progressive movement can offer modern 
American constitutional reformers a roadmap for achieving formal constitutional change. 
For those amendments whose proposers believe could have a legitimate chance at eventual 
proposal and ratification, the Progressive movement is a good model for how to create and 
ultimately entrench social change. Of course, it would be difficult if not impossible to replicate 
the success of the Progressive Era. Four amendments in the span of a decade is unprece-
dented in American history since the Bill of Rights, and it would be surprising if such a feat 
were ever to be repeated.
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